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Case No. 20000012-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take 
an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree 
or capital felony offense. Appellant Anthony Zinnerman was convicted of unlawfully 
distributing, offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony offense, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1998), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance or counterfeit 
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony offense, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1998). The judgment is in the record on appeal 
("R.") at 135-136, and is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether Zinnerman was denied a 
fair trial when the prosecutor specifically questioned him about his criminal record in 
front of the jury after the trial judge had previously ruled that such evidence was 
inadmissible. 
Standard of Review: "[I]f a trial court has applied the correct legal standard, it has 
broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for a new trial." State v. Martin. 1999 
UT 72 [^ 5, 984 P.2d 975. In determining whether a prosecutor's deliberate misconduct 
has deprived a defendant of a fair trial sufficient to warrant a new trial, this Court will 
apply a two-part test: 
[The test examines whether] '"[I] [tjhe actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call 
to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in 
determining its verdict and, [2] if so, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result'" 
[for the defendant]. 
State v. Basta. 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 
750, 754 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996)); State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 
483, 486 (Utah 1984). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue is preserved in the record on appeal at 140-41, 177. 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provision will be determinative of the issue on appeal: 
UtahR.Crim.P.24(1999). 
The text of that provision is contained in the attached Addendum B. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
On July 31, 1998, the state charged Appellant/Defendant Anthony Zinnerman 
with two second degree felony offenses: Unlawfully distributing, offering, agreeing, 
consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, and unlawful 
possession of a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute. (R. 13-14.) 
On May 20, 1999, the lower court commenced the trial in this matter. On May 21, 
1999, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty with respect to both counts. (R. 130-31.) The 
judge sentenced Zinnerman to two concurrent prison terms of 1 to 15 years. (R. 135-36.) 
Zinnerman is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. OFFICERS ENGAGED IN AN UNDERCOVER DRUG OPERATION IN 
MAY 1998. 
On May 22, 1998, Detectives Johnson and Roberts were involved in an 
undercover drug operation near Pioneer Park in Salt Lake City. (R. 175:6-9, 110.) As 
they drove through an area that is known for drug trafficking, Roberts held money up 
toward the windshield to indicate an interest in a drug deal. (R. 175:9, 111.) 
If somebody is trafficking narcotics and they see that, if they're interested in a 
drug transaction, they'll normally give you a nod or they'll wave you with their 
arm to come over to make contact. 
(R. 175:9.) LaVon Brown nodded to the detectives and waved them over, indicating the 
"beginnings of a drug transaction." (R. 175:10-12, 111.) 
3 
When the detectives pulled up to Brown, they asked if he had any "coca" or 
"cheeva," street terms for cocaine and heroin. (R. 175:12.) Brown asked the detectives if 
they were police. When they responded they were not, Brown motioned for them to "pull 
in." (R. 175:12-13.) 
The detectives were uneasy with Brown's request. Johnson told Brown he would 
circle the block and be right back. (R. 175:13, 112.) Johnson wanted to advise the take-
down unit of the plan without alerting Brown to the communication. (Id.) 
When Johnson and Roberts returned, they asked Brown again for cocaine or 
cheeva. (R. 175:15.) Brown asked to see Johnson's paraphernalia to assess whether he 
was legitimate. (R. 175:15-16.) When Johnson explained that he "snorted" cocaine and 
was checking into the heroin for a friend, Brown told the detectives to hold on. Brown 
walked back some distance and made contact with a second man, who officers described 
as approximately 63" and intimidating (referred to herein as the "second suspect"). (R. 
175:16,113.) 
Johnson observed the second suspect take a quantity of what he believed to be 
drugs from a bag and hand it to Brown. (R. 175:18, 114.) Brown returned to the 
officers, gave the bag to Roberts, and Roberts handed the money to Brown. (R. 175:19, 
115.) 
As Johnson drove away, he observed Brown and the second suspect get into a car. 
Johnson relayed the information to the take-down team, which included Detective Jason 
4 
Mazuran. (R. 175:24-25, 85-86, 117.) Mazuran pulled the car over to arrest Brown and 
the second suspect, while Johnson circled the area. Johnson and Roberts returned to the 
area and identified the suspects. During a search of the second suspect, officers found 
additional drugs. (R. 175:27, 118.) 
After the arrest, both men were released in order that they could work with 
detectives in locating a drug supplier. (R. 175:41.) After approximately an hour and a 
half, when detectives could not make contact with a supplier (R. 175:42), Johnson 
provided his telephone number to the second suspect. (R. 175:43.) Thereafter, for the 
next month, Johnson received one or two phone messages from the second suspect. (R. 
175:43, 68.) 
B. THE OFFICERS DESCRIBED A SCAR ON THE SECOND SUSPECT'S 
ABDOMEN. 
Mazuran, Johnson and Roberts identified Zinnerman at trial as the second suspect 
in the drug transaction. (R. 175:17, 22, 26-27, 90, 116.) The state's rebuttal witness, 
Detective Carr, also identified Zinnerman. (R. 176:197.) The officers each testified they 
observed a scar on the second suspect's stomach at the time of the search incident to 
arrest. (R. 175:38,71,91-92, 118-19; 176:197.) Zinnerman had a scar on his abdomen; 
the officers identified Zinnerman9 s scar as belonging to the suspect based on a 
photograph presented at trial. (R. 175:38-39; 176:197.) 
C. EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT OFFICERS DID NOT CONFIRM THE 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE SECOND SUSPECT DURING THE INCIDENT, 
AND THEY DID NOT MAKE SPECIFIC NOTES CONCERNING HIM. 
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Johnson testified he did not review or confirm identification information 
concerning the second suspect at the time of the incident, and he did not photograph him 
or take him to jail. (R. 175:51, 62, 72.) Johnson testified that when he prepared his 
report in connection with the case, there was a discrepancy as to whether the second 
suspect was "Zinnerman" or "Zimmerman." (R. 175:50.) Also, Johnson testified that he 
did not note in his report that the second suspect had a scar; rather, he testified to that fact 
for the first time at the preliminary hearing. (R. 175:71.) 
Johnson's report identified the suspect as Zinnerman, date of birth, height, weight, 
and that he was from South Carolina. (R. 175:49-50.) Johnson did not get such 
information from the second suspect. (R. 175:51.) In addition, Johnson did not "run" or 
generate the report that reflected such information. (R. 175:51.) Likewise, he did not 
run a standard driver's license check on either individual. (R. 175:61.) 
When Johnson turned the case over to the district attorney, there was an issue 
concerning the identification of the second suspect, where the assistant district attorney 
may have requested a photo identification for the person who allegedly was involved in 
the May 22 drug transaction. (R. 175:69.) Since officers failed to maintain identification 
information, they could not provide assistance. (R. 175:70.) 
Mazuran and Carr each testified they did not prepare a report in connection with 
the incident. (R. 175:96; 176:199.) Also, Mazuran did not obtain or investigate 
identification information relating to the suspects. (R. 175:99, 101.) 
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Roberts claimed that the physical difference between Brown and the second 
suspect, who were both black, was that the second suspect was taller. (R. 175:131.) 
Roberts also testified that he conducted the search on the second suspect. He did not 
make note of a scar on the second suspect's stomach. (R. 175:132.) Roberts claimed that 
the scar was not an important detail to him in part because it was similar to the surgical, 
appendectomy scar that Roberts had. (See R. 175:132, 118-19.) Roberts did not 
consider the scar to be an important feature or detail, apparently because it was not 
uncommon. (SeeR. 175:119, 132.) 
Roberts testified that he reviewed an identification card briefly. He "assume[d]" it 
belonged to defendant but could not specifically recall. (R. 175:133-34.) 
Through cross-examination, the defense was able to present evidence that the 
officers did not confirm the identity of the second suspect at the time of the incident, 
there was confusion with respect to his name, they did not note details about his features, 
and they did not mention that the second suspect had a scar on his stomach. Rather, 
officers reported such information later. Also, specific information about Zinnerman 
would have been available to officers at a later date. (See R. 176:176-77.) 
D. ZINNERMAN TESTIFIED THAT ON MAY 22. HE WAS AT A 
BARBECUE: ALSO. AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE OBSERVED THE 
SCAR ON HIS ABDOMEN WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED IN NOVEMBER 
1998. 
Zinnerman denied involvement in the drug transaction on May 22, 1998. (R. 
176:168, 177.) He testified that he attended a barbecue with friends, including Rudolph 
7 
Martin, on that day. (R. 176:170.) Rudolph Martin offered corroborating testimony to 
support that on May 22, Zinnerman was not at Pioneer Park; Zinnerman was at a 
barbecue with friends most of the day. (R. 176:204-06.) 
Zinnerman was arrested in November 1998 for the offenses in this case. He was 
required to remove his clothing at the jail. (R. 176:176-77.) State agents would have 
observed a scar on Zinnerman's abdomen prior to the state's presentation of testimony 
from officers concerning a scar on the second suspect's stomach. (R. 176:176-77.) 
E. ZINNERMAN REQUESTED SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE RELATING 
TO HIS PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD: ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT 
GRANTED THE REQUEST. THE PROSECUTOR ASKED ABOUT 
ZINNERMAN'S CRIMINAL BACKGROUND AT TRIAL. 
Before trial, counsel for the defense moved to suppress evidence concerning 
Zinnerman's criminal history and prior bad acts. (R. 61-62.) The trial judge granted the 
motion, stating that with respect to evidence of prior crimes, "I'm not going to allow it to 
be brought up." (R. 175:35.) The court further explained that such evidence "would 
only be admissible, I guess, if he gets up there and says he's never been convicted of a 
felony or something like that." (R. 175:35.) 
On the second day of trial, Zinnerman testified. During direct examination, he 
was not asked about a criminal history or prior felony offenses. (R. 176:168-78.) On 
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked, "Mr. Zinnerman, have you previously been 
convicted of a felony?" (R. 176:190.) The prosecutor acknowledged that in connection 
with asking that question, he was in possession of a certified copy of a sentence/judg-
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ment/order reflecting a previous conviction, and he referred to the piece of paper during 
that particular portion of the examination. (R. 146, 149.) In response, "Defendant did 
not answer the question." (R. 147.) 
Thereafter, counsel for the defense objected to the question. The trial judge 
instructed the jury that the question was improper and to "disregard" it. (R. 176:190.) 
The defense moved for a new trial as a result of the prosecutorial misconduct. (R. 140-
41.) The trial court denied the motion. (R. 157-58.) On appeal, Zinnerman is 
challenging the trial court's ruling on the motion for a new trial. 
Additional facts relevant to the issue on appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Prior to the trial in this case, the defense moved to have evidence of Zinnerman's 
alleged, prior criminal record suppressed. The trial judge granted the motion and stated 
that such evidence would only be permitted under limited circumstances. Thereafter, in 
violation of the court's order, the prosecutor specifically asked Zinnerman about his 
criminal record, apparently in an effort either to get Zinnerman to admit that such a 
record existed, or to deny it in order that the prosecutor could introduce the specifics of 
the alleged record into evidence. The defense objected to the question, and the judge 
ordered that it be stricken. 
On appeal, Zinnerman maintains that the improper question called the jury's 
attention to matters the jury would not be justified in considering. Although the judge 
instructed the jury to disregard the question, the jury was left with the impression that the 
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defense had something to hide with respect to Zinnerman's criminal history. A curative 
instruction provided to the jury was insufficient to obviate prejudicial error. 
In addition, under the circumstances of this particular case, there was a probability 
that the jurors were influenced by the prosecutor's remarks. The case at trial hinged on 
the credibility of witnesses. Four police officers testified they observed the second 
suspect involved in a drug transaction on May 22, 1998. The officers identified 
Zinnerman as the second suspect. Yet, they acknowledged they did not take 
identification information from the second suspect; they did not note any distinguishing 
characteristic about the second suspect at the time of the incident; and there was some 
confusion as to whether the second suspect was "Zinnerman" or "Zimmerman." When 
it was determined weeks later that Zinnerman should be arrested for the offense, state 
agents would have observed a scar on his stomach that officers later testified belonged to 
the second suspect. The defense elicited testimony from officers that may have placed 
their credibility in issue. Also, the defense presented evidence that Zinnerman was not 
involved in the transaction. Thus, where the jury was required to resolve credibility 
issues, the jury may have been influenced by the suggestion from the prosecution that 
Zinnerman had a criminal history. 
ARGUMENT 
ZINNERMAN IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL WHERE THE 
PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT, 
The prosecutor in this case committed deliberate misconduct. He asked Zinnerman 
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about his criminal background after the judge had ruled that such questions would not be 
allowed unless Zinnerman took the witness stand and said "he's never been convicted of 
a felony or something like that" (SeeR. 176:190; 175:35.) As a result of the 
misconduct, Zinnerman requested a new trial pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
Rule 24 provides that a defendant may be entitled to a new trial "if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24 (1999). A trial court has discretion under Rule 24 to grant a new 
trial, and an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's ruling unless it appears the 
trial court has abused its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant. See State v. Smith, 
776 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1989); see also State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 
1998) (quoting State v. Hav. 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993); other cites omitted). 
Prosecutorial misconduct may be grounds for a new trial. See State v. Owens, 
753 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1988). 
In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct has deprived defendant of a fair 
trial, Utah appellate courts have applied a two-part test: 
[This test examines whether] '"[I] [t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call 
to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in 
determining its verdict and, [2] if so, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result.'" 
State v. Basta. 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 
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750, 754 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996)); State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 
483,486 (Utah 1984). The first step is "clearly met" when the prosecutor has violated 
the court's order restricting the scope of the prosecutor's examination of a witness. State 
v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991). The second part of the test is "more difficult." 
Id. It refers to the prejudice analysis. "If the prejudice is such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood the jury would have reached a more favorable result absent the comments, we 
will reverse." State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997). As set forth below, 
Zinnerman has met both parts of the test. 
A. THE PROSECUTOR SPECIFICALLY ASKED ABOUT ZINNERMAN'S 
CRIMINAL HISTORY AFTER THE TRIAL COURT RULED SUCH AN 
INQUIRY WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED. 
Applying the first part of the test, the prosecutor called the attention of jurors to 
matters they were not justified in considering. 
Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion to suppress evidence of defendant's 
alleged criminal background and bad acts, pursuant to Rules 609(a)(1) and 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. (R. 61-62.) The motion apparently related to three prior alleged 
offenses: aggravated assault, battery and "false information."1 (R. 175:35.) 
Pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of prior crimes is 
presumed prejudicial. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985) (interpreting 
l Under Utah statutory law, a person is guilty of a misdemeanor offense if he provides 
false information to any peace officer. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-506 (1999). 
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earlier version of rule). It shall be admitted only if the court determines "that the pro-
bative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused." 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) (1999); see Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741 (under prior version of 
rule, party seeking to introduce such evidence must show some reason other than 
criminal disposition); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 (Utah 1989); State v. Lanier, 778 
P.2d 9, 10 (Utah 1989); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986). 
In addition, Rule 404(b) provides that "evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith." The rule specifies the circumstances under which evidence relating to such 
acts may be admissible. Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (1999). 
In this matter, during a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor 
claimed he had certified documents to support the fact that Zinnerman pled guilty to 
certain offenses. (R. 175:35.) The documents are not contained in the file and were not 
offered into evidence by the prosecutor. The prosecutor's statements were insufficient to 
constitute evidence of the facts asserted. See State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928 n.l 
(Utah App. 1998) (party has duty to support allegations with adequate record). In 
addition, the prosecutor did not allege that circumstances existed in this case to allow the 
presentation of the evidence under Rule 609 or 404(b). (See R. 175:35); Banner, 717 
P.2d at 1334 ("Mr. Gunnarson offered no evidence that introduction of the convictions 
was more probative than prejudicial"). 
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Thus, the judge granted the motion to suppress and ruled that evidence concerning 
Zinnerman's criminal background could not "be brought up." (R. 175.35.) The trial 
judge also stated that evidence relating to the alleged aggravated assault offense "would 
only be admissible, I guess, if he gets up there and says he's never been convicted of a 
felony or something like that." (R. 175:35.) 
On the second day of trial, Zinnerman testified. During cross-examination, the 
prosecutor asked the following question: "Mr. Zinnerman, have you previously been 
convicted of a felony?" (R. 176:190.) The prosecutor acknowledged that he held a 
"docket at the podium as the question was asked." (R. 149.) Zinnerman "did not answer 
the question." (R. 147.) Thereafter, counsel for the defense objected, and the trial judge 
instructed the jury to disregard the question. (R. 176:190.) 
The prosecutor's question called the jury's attention to matters the jury was not 
allowed to consider. Utah R. Evid. 404(b); 609(a)(1) (1999). Pursuant to Rule 3.4(e), 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer may not allude to any matter "that the 
lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible 
evidence." See Troy. 688 P.2d at 486-87 (counsel is obligated to avoid any reference to 
matters the jury is not justified in considering; also, prosecutor's question concerning 
defendant's criminal background was an improper attempt to bias the jury). 
The question was an attempt by the prosecutor to create an impression in the 
M 
minds of jury members that Zinnerman was a bad person, and should not be believed 
because he had a criminal background. Since the prosecutor had plain directions from 
the trial judge that the information concerning Zinnerman's alleged criminal record was 
inadmissible, it was improper for the prosecutor to allude to such matters. Span, 819 
P.2d at 335. Zinnerman has met the first prong in establishing that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial for prosecutorial misconduct. 
See Basta, 966 P.2d at 268. 
B. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. THE ERROR WAS 
SUBSTANTIAL AND PREJUDICIAL REQUIRING REVERSAL. 
A prosecutor's misconduct constitutes reversible error when the error is 
"substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, 
there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 
1, 6 (Utah 1993) (cites omitted); State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998); 
Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1352; Trov, 688 P.2d at 486-87; see State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1224 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400,403 (Utah 1986)). 
When the prosecutor improperly suggests to the jury that defendant has a sordid or 
criminal background, that suggestion may have an enormous impact on defendant's case. 
Such an error is substantial. Whether the defendant responds to the suggestion or 
remains silent is irrelevant. The effect is devastating either way: The jury either learns 
about the criminal past, or the jury is left with the impression that defendant has 
something to hide in refusing to answer the question. 
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The improper question presents the jury with an opportunity to assume the 
defendant is a bad person, is probably guilty of the crime at issue because he has 
committed past crimes, or has something to hide about a criminal past. "The deep 
tendency of human nature to punish not because [the defendant] is guilty this time but 
because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is caught is a 
tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court." 1 A.J. Wigmore, 
Evidence § 57 at 1185 (Tillers rev. 1983). "The insinuation that other evidence exists 
encourages the jury to determine its verdict based upon evidence outside the record and 
jeopardizes a defendant's right to a trial based upon the evidence presented." State v. 
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, the prosecutor's question about Zinnerman's criminal background 
constituted substantial error. The prosecutor likely was aware that the question presented 
a "trilemma." See American Fork v. Cosgrove. 701 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1985) 
(recognizing the "cruel trilemma" that existed in English ecclesiastical courts when the 
defendant was required to answer all questions directed to him). Once the question was 
out, Zinnerman could acknowledge an alleged conviction for a felony offense; he could 
deny the matter, thereby opening the door for the prosecution to present evidence of 
Zinnerman's alleged criminal past; or he could refuse to answer the question, thereby 
leaving the jury to believe he had something to hide. 
Even though Zinnerman did not answer the question, the suggestion of a criminal 
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background may have added critical weight to the prosecutor's case, while Zinnerman 
was powerless to dispute it. Zinnerman could not dispute the implication left by the 
question without opening the door to the presentation of more information by the 
prosecutor. The misconduct constituted substantial error. 
The error also was prejudicial. Utah appellate courts have ruled that prosecutorial 
misconduct is prejudicial when it is directed at the defendant, when the misconduct 
relates to an issue that the jury must decide, when the jury is presented with a case that 
involves credibility issues surrounding the witnesses, and when the state has failed to 
offer nontestimonial evidence to support its witnesses' version of the events. See Troy, 
688 P.2d at 486; State v. Bvrd. 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah App. 1997). 
In Troy, 688 P.2d at 486, the prosecutor committed misconduct when he referred 
to defendant's alias and residential situation under a federal identity, when he asked 
about defendant's "various criminal matters," and when he compared the defendant to 
criminals who have "all kinds of irrational behavior ... Hinckley is a classic example." 
Id. Since the misconduct was directed at the defendant, the supreme court determined 
the error was "qualitatively different" from misconduct directed at other witnesses: The 
jury was more likely to be influenced by the misconduct. Span, 819 P.2d at 335 (in cases 
where conduct is directed at defendant, court is more inclined to find that jury may have 
been unduly influenced by the prosecutorial misconduct); see also State v. WiswelL 639 
P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981); Bvrd. 937 P.2d at 536; State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293, 
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1297 (Utah App. 1997). In this matter, the improper question concerning the criminal 
history was directed at Zinnerman. The prosecutor specifically intended to discredit 
Zinnerman to the jury or make him look like a bad person. 
Utah appellate courts also have recognized that under the prejudice analysis, 
prosecutorial misconduct is more likely to unduly influence the jury when the jury is 
presented with conflicting evidence and is required to resolve credibility issues. Troy, 
688 P.2d at 486. To that end, the court may consider the circumstantial nature of the 
state's evidence and the defendant's case. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 787 
(Utah App. 1991) (prejudice analysis compares impact of prosecutorial misconduct, other 
evidence of guilt and evidence that may absolve defendant of crime). 
"Courts have generally refused[] to conclude that evidence was overwhelming in 
cases that ultimately rested on the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence, particularly 
where the defendant's credibility is involved." Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536; State v. 
Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1986) ("When the evidence in the record is 
circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely influenced by an 
improper argument"). "If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing 
conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater 
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. Indeed, 
in such cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the 
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evidence. They may be susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may be 
sufficient to affect the verdict." Trov, 688 P.2d at 486; Andreason, 718 P.2d at 403. 
In this case, the pivotal issues concerned the identification of the second suspect 
and the credibility of the witnesses. While four officers testified that Zinnerman was the 
second suspect, they also testified that on May 22, they failed to confirm information 
concerning the second suspect's identity; they did not prepare reports regarding the 
matter (R. 175:96 (Mazuran did not prepare report); 176:199 (Carr did not prepare 
report)); and/or they did not note anything particular about the second suspect. (See R. 
175:71 (Johnson did not indicate existence of a scar until preliminary hearing); 175:124-
25 (Roberts searched second suspect at the time of the incident and did not note scar).) 
In addition, there was a question as to whether the second suspect was "Zinnerman" or 
"Zimmerman." (R. 175:49-50,69-70.) 
The evidence supports that officers did not gather information about the second 
suspect during the incident; rather, they collected information about Zinnerman at a later 
date. The officers may have learned about the scar in November 1998 when Zinnerman 
was arrested, months after the alleged incident but prior to officers testifying in the case. 
(R. 176:176 (Zinnerman arrested in November 1998 and required to remove clothing, 
revealing scar); 175:71 (Johnson first indicated the existence of a scar at preliminary 
hearing in February 1999).) The crux of Zinnerman's case was that the officers had the 
wrong person; they let the second suspect get away. Since officers did not know the 
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second suspect, they learned enough about Zinnerman later through other sources to 
provide specific testimony that he was the suspect. 
Zinnerman presented evidence at trial that he was not the second suspect. He 
testified that he did not know the officers, he was not in the area of Pioneer Park on May 
22, and he was not involved in the drug transaction. (R. 176:168, 170, 177.) Rudolph 
Martin presented corroborating testimony as to Zinnerman's whereabouts on May 22. 
(R. 176:204-06.) Zinnerman's "credibility before the jury was crucial to his defense." 
Aesoph v. State. 721 P.2d 379, 383 (Nev. 1986). Because the state and Zinnerman 
offered conflicting versions of the events surrounding the drug transaction, the case came 
down to the word of the defense against the word of the state's witnesses. See Byrd 937 
P.2dat536. The jury "could have found either way." Troy, 688 P.2d at 487. Evidence 
presented by the defense would have absolved Zinnerman of the crime. Under these 
circumstances, the evidence against Zinnerman was not so overwhelming as to overcome 
the prejudice that existed as a result of the prosecutor introducing the suggestion that 
Zinnerman had a criminal record or was a bad person. 
Finally, the state offered no decisive nontestimonial evidence against Zinnerman. 
The evidence consisted only of the officers' testimony where they failed to note details 
about the second suspect at the time of the incident. Given the nature of the state's 
evidence against Zinnerman, the prosecutorial misconduct tipped the balance against 
Zinnerman by suggesting he was either a bad person with a criminal background, or had 
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something to hide. Thus, there was a likelihood that jurors would be improperly 
influenced by the prosecutor's improper question, which left a negative implication 
concerning the defendant. By alluding to a criminal record, the prosecutor may have 
caused the jury to convict Zinnerman for who he was and not what he allegedly did. 
Zinnerman was prejudiced by the prosecutor's misconduct. The trial court erred in failing 
to order a new trial. 
C. THE CURATIVE INSTRUCTION WAS INSUFFICIENT TO OBVIATE 
THE PREJUDICE. 
After the prosecutor asked the improper question, the judge ruled the question 
should be stricken and instructed the jury as follows: "Ladies and gentlemen, that's an 
improper question to be asked in this court and he's not going to be allowed to ask that 
question so disregard the question." (R. 176:190.) The curative instruction was 
insufficient to neutralize any damage. Jurors were left to speculate with respect to what 
the answer would have been, and may have inflated the importance of the undisclosed 
information or the fact that the defense did not answer the question. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that curative instructions "are a settled and 
necessary feature of our judicial process and one of the most important tools by which a 
court may remedy errors at trial." State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 1998); see. 
also State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 929-30 (Utah App. 1998). The supreme court 
also has recognized that curative instructions "are not always sufficient to avoid the 
potential prejudice to the defendant. [State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 1988)]. 
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The potential for prejudice is greatest when the circumstantial facts are closely related to 
the issue the jury must ultimately decide." State v. WetzeL 868 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37 (Utah 1996) (potential error was obviated with 
"sufficiently"correct curative instruction). "This court acknowledges that curative 
instructions are not without defect or limitation." Harmon. 956 P.2d at 273 n.9. 
In Harmon, the court recognized that curative instructions are not a "cure-all." 
Harmon. 956 P.2d at 273. Also, to neutralize the damage of prosecutorial misconduct, a 
curative instruction should be prompt, effective, and strong. See id. at 272 (citing U.S. v. 
Weitzenhoff. 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A] prompt and effective 
admonishment of counsel or curative instruction from the trial judge may effectively 
'neutralize the damage'") (quoting U.S. v. Simtob. 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990)); 
U.S. v. Diaz-Carreon. 915 F.2d 951, 959 (5th Cir. 1990) (court's strong curative 
instruction and condemnation of prosecutor's tactics effectively neutralized damaging 
effect of improper prosecutorial remarks)); see also Harmon, 956 P.2d at 278 (Durham, 
J., concurring) (there is a significant likelihood that "our collective confidence in the 
curative instruction as a valuable 'tool' is not substantiated by reality"); see also State v. 
Boyatt 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App. 1993) (no prosecutorial misconduct where trial court 
provided complete instruction on the law and directed jury to follow law as stated by 
court). 
In this case, the curative instruction was not effective. The trial judge ordered the 
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jury to disregard the question, but did not inform the jury that it may not speculate as to 
whether Zinnerman had a prior felony conviction or criminal background, or as to why 
defendant did not respond to the improper question. An appropriate curative instruction 
would have explained to the jury that the prosecutor may not ask such questions and, 
also, that he is not entitled to the answer; therefore, it would be inappropriate to speculate 
one way or the other as to what the answer would have been. Without an effective 
curative instruction, the jury was left believing Zinnerman had something to hide, i.e. a 
prior felony conviction. See Elliott v. State, 984 S.W.2d 362 (Ark. 1998) (reference to 
defendant as habitual criminal cannot be cured); Ex Parte Sparks, 730 So.2d 113 (Ala. 
1998) (curative instruction cannot be expected to ameliorate evidence of defendant's 
criminal background). 
Finally, with respect to the general jury charge, the last sentence in Instruction 29 
provided the following: "As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you 
must not conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the 
objection." (R. 123.) Such an instruction may have neutralized damage caused by the 
prosecutor in asking the improper question if such an instruction had been given when 
the misconduct occurred. See U.S. v. Cudlitz. 72 F.3d 992, 1002 (1st Cir. 1996) (a 
curative instruction is effective if it is brought in a timely manner); U.S. v. Solivan. 937 
F.2dll46, 1156 (6th Cir. 1991): State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929. 933 (Utah App. 1991) 
(in response to prosecutor's misstatement, judge promptly called the attention of the jury 
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to appropriate written instructions), revM on other grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, Instruction 29 was not provided to the jury in connection with the 
misconduct. Rather, the trial court provided Instruction 29 to the jury together with a 
packet of 34 written instructions. (See R. 91 (jury instructed at the close of defendant's 
case).) It is unlikely the jury made the relationship between Instruction 29 and the 
misconduct, particularly where the instruction referred to a "sustained" objection while 
the trial judge did not use such language when the misconduct occurred. (Compare R. 
123 with R. 176:190.) 
The error in this case was not satisfactorily corrected. The curative instruction 
and written jury charge were insufficient to overcome the prejudice caused by the 
implications raised as a result of the prosecutor's improper question. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Zinnerman respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the conviction and remand the matter for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this /3&dav of V/y^^Ju 2000. 
LINDA M.JONES 
DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 981914830 FS 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Date: July 12, 1999 
PRESENT 
Clerk: audreyj 
Prosecutor: POSTMA, MICHAEL E 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DEBORAH KREECKMENDEZ 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 14, 1967 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 12-27-15 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/21/1999 Guilty Plea 
2. POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/21/1999 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/INTENT TO DIST 
CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years m the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
Page 1 
Case No: 981914830 
Date: Jul 12, 1999 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison on both counts to run concurrent with each other but 
consecutive with any other sentence. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court will stay the imposition of this sentence until the defense 
motion for new trial can be heard. 
Dated this $L day of 
Page 2 (last) i-a. 
ADDENDUM B 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) Amotion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
